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The main driving force of the financial crisis of 2007-2009 was a rapid deterioration of the trust of private 
agents in the quality of financial institutions. In turn, this loss of confidence entailed the collapse of 
several key asset markets and a sharp decline in the other asset prices. This paper surveys the critical 
moments of the crisis, puts forward some of the shock amplifying mechanisms and comments on the 
effectiveness of various policy measures. The conclusion opens the debate on what structural changes in 
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Four Myths and a Financial Crisis 
 
Radu Vranceanu 
ESSEC Business School, 






The main driving force of the financial crisis of 2007-2009 was a rapid deterioration of the trust of 
private agents in the quality of financial institutions. In turn, this loss of confidence entailed a sharp 
decline  in  many  asset  prices  and  brought  to  their knees  several  large  financial  institutions with 
centennial tradition. This paper surveys the critical moments of the crisis, presents some of the shock 
amplifying mechanisms and comments on the effectiveness of various policy measures. We point out 
four conceptual myths that did not survived to this crisis. The conclusion opens the debate on what 
structural changes in the existing financial architecture are required to contain such crises in the 
future. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This last crisis that some observers refer to as the Great Recession began in the summer of 2007 with 
reassessment of the risk on subprime American mortgage loans, then turned into a genuine banking 
system crisis in the US and Europe, ending up as a full-blown real economic crisis affecting most 
countries in the world by late 2008.
1 Overall, in 2009 the GDP has declined by 2.5% in the United 
States, 5.3% in Japan and 3.9% in the Euro Area. Unemployment reached levels not seen since the 
major oil shocks in the 70s, and the fiscal position of many developed count ries deteriorated 
dramatically. The situation is  well summarized by Miller and Stiglitz (2010, p.500), “From 2007 to 
2009 a chain of events, beginning with unexpected losses in the US-subprime market, was destined 
to bring the global financial system close to collapse and to drag the world economy into recession”. 
 
There have of course been other banking crises in the past (at least thirty major crises of the type 
were recorded between 1980 and 1996), generating substantial private and social costs (Demigüç-
Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008).
2 The 2007-2009 crisis, however, differs from 
past banking crises not only in its strength and multiple ramifications, but also in its worldwide reach. 
It provided a lesson of humility for a majority of policymakers and scholars, including the author of 
this text, who underestimated the size of the accumulated fiscal imbalances and  the would-be real 
consequences of these financial imbalances. The truth is that almost nobody has foreseen this crisis, 
and we do not refer here to those pessimistic scholars who see a crisis everywhere and anytime.
3 
 
The period 1985-1995 marked a significant turning point in the organisation of the world economy. 
An overwhelming process of liberalisation of movements of capi tal was set in motion, initially in 
developed countries then extending to developing countries.   At the same time, new financial 
instruments  such as derivatives and structured products  were created, with the aim of hedging 
against an ever-broader range of risks. The sophistication of these products grew constantly, as did 
trading volumes. 
 
While this  powerful  expansion in the financial market over the last twenty years has fostered 
worldwide growth through better resource allocation in time and the creation of new opportunities 
for risk diversification, it is also  contributed to increase economic instability, by calling for a more 
substantial  role  for  people’s  beliefs  in  structuring  reality  itself.  Indeed,  the  nature  of  the 
“commodities” traded on this market is highly specific. In very general terms, the financial market is 
defined as the place where resources are traded over time; those currently in possession of surplus 
resources make them available to businesses that have nice investment opportunities but lack those 
resources, in exchange for the promise of receiving more resources at a later date. Trade may take 
place  directly  through  securities  such  as  stocks  and  bonds,  which  transfer  rights  to  future 
remuneration  directly  to  the  purchaser,  or  through  the  intermediary  of  specialist  financial 
institutions (banks) that receive resources on deposit and grant loans. 
 
There is an element of uncertainty inherent to all trade in resources over time, as naturally any 
promise due to be fulfilled in the future carries a risk of default. The higher the risk, the higher the 
premium required by lenders in addition to a risk-free interest rate. But the price of risk has an 
impact on the amount of risk. For instance, when a firm needs to borrow to finance its development, 
if lenders assess the risk of default as low, they claim a small interest rate, and chances of the 
                                                           
1 The early signals of the troubles to come were recorded in February 2007 when HSBC and New Century 
Financial called for greater than expected loss provision on their loan portfolio (Pomfret, 2010). 
2 In particular, the sequence of events in this crisis bears strong similarities to the crisis that hit the banking 
sector in Sweden, Norway and Finland in the late 1980s. See Englund (1999). 
3 In the early 2000s, many economists were worried about the large trade deficit of the US and the risks that a 
sharp devaluation of the US currency would pose: this scenario never materialized.   3 
borrowing firm to repay the loan and pay the agreed interest are high. If on the other hand lenders 
assess the risk as high and ask for a high interest rate, the borrowing firm will find it difficult to 
honour its obligations and, ex post, the assessment of the risk as high will also turn out to be right. 
This  simplified  illustration  demonstrates  an  important  development  in  contemporary 
macroeconomics – the concept of multiple equilibria. From this perspective, economic situations, 
that for simplicity’s sake we can refer to as “good” or “bad”, are both possible, and materialisation of 
either  depends  to  a  large  extent  on  the  beliefs  of  economic  agents  (see  also  Stiglitz,  2010). 
Furthermore, a sudden deterioration of these beliefs can shift the equilibrium from the good to the 
bad situation, even if nothing affected the so-called fundamentals of the economy. 
 
From the multiple equilibria perspective, the 2007-2009 crisis has been characterised by sharp, rapid 
deterioration in the economic agents’ perception of the quality of firms in the financial sector, and 
the quality of the products they manufactured and sold. It can thus be defined primarily as a crisis of 
trust or confidence. In practice, the trademark of such a crisis is the disappearance of buyers (for 
various goods and assets), and with them the liquidity so badly needed by firms to meet their short-
term  commitments  (Krishnamurthy,  2009).  In  turn,  the  shortage  of  liquidity  stemming  from 
pessimistic  expectations  has  dramatic  consequences  on  financial  institutions  that  restrain  from 
taking risks, thus do not longer fulfil their social mission. 
 
It  should  be  noticed  from  the  outset  that  economists  were  victims  of  a  dangerous  myth  that 
prevented  them  to  properly  evaluate  such  macroeconomic  risks.  Hundreds  of  studies  used  the 
multiple equilibrium approach to explain exchange rate and financial crises that hurt the developing 
world in the last thirty years. Yet, when it turned to developed countries, economists seem to have a 
blind faith in that the “bad” equilibrium could never materialize, allegedly because rich countries 
have much a better governance than developing countries.  
 
One specific form of multiple equilibria are asset price bubbles. In a bubble, the price of an asset at 
one moment in time no longer depends on the discounted stream of future payments but on the 
expectation that its price will go up. If all agents form similar expectations, they buy the asset and its 
price  goes  up,  thus  validating  the  initial  out-of-fundamentals  beliefs.  As  no  price  can  go  up 
indefinitely, sharp and wide downside adjustments are the only possible outcome; unfortunately, no 
model can forecast the precise moment when the adjustment will take place. For years, under Alan 
Greenspan’s presidency, the official position of the Fed (the US central bank) was to let markets 
behave, and be ready to intervene once that the bubble bursts. By 2004, Alan Greenspan and the Fed 
officials  became  aware  that  something  ugly  is  happening  with  housing  prices,  yet  they 
underestimated the size of the required intervention, and did not realized how limited was their 
capacity  to  react  should  they  be  confronted  with  a  major  disruption  of  financial  markets.  In  a 
representative quote, Alan Greenspan stated:
4 
 
“In  a  related  concern,  a  number  of  analysts  have  conjectured  that  the 
extended period of low interest rates is spawning a bubble in housing prices in 
the United States that will, at some point, implode. Their concern is that, if this 
were to occur, highly leveraged homeowners will be forced to sharply curtail 
their spending. To be sure, indexes of house prices based on repeat sales of 
existing homes have outstripped increases in rents, suggesting at least the 
possibility  of  price  misalignment  in  some  housing  markets.  A  softening  in 
housing markets would likely be one of many adjustments that would occur in 
                                                           
4  Alan  Greenspan,  Globalization  and  innovation,  Remarks  at  the  Conference  on  Bank  Structure  and 
Competition,  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Chicago,  Chicago,  Illinois,  May  6,  2004.  Online  at: 
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/200405062/default.htm.   4 
the wake of an increase in interest rates. But a destabilizing contraction in 
nationwide house prices does not seem the most probable outcome. Indeed, 
nominal house prices in the aggregate have rarely fallen and certainly not by 
very much.” 
 
This crisis killed this first myth: we know now that high income countries are as prone as low income 
countries to the curse of multiple equilibria and that asset price bubbles are a problem serious 
enough to be a matter of concern for policymakers and regulators. 
 
One  overwhelming  mistake  made  by  economists  and  other  experts  in  charge  with  monitoring 
stability of our economic systems was to pay too little attention to the recent financial innovations, 
and to the new risks that they imposed on the financial system. Two particular innovations become 
important vectors of shock propagation and amplification: CDOs (for Collateralized Debt Obligations) 
and CDSs (Credit Default Swaps). While prior to 2007 almost nobody outside the finance profession 
has heard about these instruments, during the crisis they made big titles in specialized newspapers. 
No doubt, economists missed something important. By paying only secondary attention to the recent 
financial innovations, they paved the way for two other harmful myths to arise, that of a diluting 
mortgage risk and that of the alleged separation between the financial and the real sector. 
 
The statement made in 2005 by the Fed vice chairman, Roger W. Ferguson describes well the the 
dominant state of mind:
5 
 
“Financial engineering has produced many innovations that enable risks to be 
unbundled and dispersed throughout the financial system. For example, the 
new  technologies  of  securitization and  credit  derivatives help  banks better 
manage  their  exposure  to  credit  risk  by  offloading  some  of  their  risk  to 
institutional  investors  who  appear  to  be  more  willing  and  able  to  bear  it. 
Dispersing risk widely creates a more resilient financial system, which in turn 
allows the economy to better weather disruptions.” 
 
While there is truth in the risk dispersion theory, no one has realized that risk diffusion comes with 
its own problems. By slicing and then selling bits of dubious assets, everybody ended up by holding 
some. When these assets started to default, no one could properly assess the magnitude of the 
contamination. Furthermore, at difference with epidemiology, in financial markets misperceptions 
magnify the deterioration of the value of the dubious assets themselves. We will turn back to this 
story after introducing the main facts.  
 
After this crisis, economists will also have to think about their theories. The dominant paradigm in 
monetary economics and monetary policymaking was developed in the late 1990s as an attempt to 
rationalize the observed central bank behaviour (for many years now central bankers were steering 
short-term interest rates with a more or less explicit objective of achieving low inflation) and the new 
stability of growth and inflation rates in the developed countries, a trend often referred to as “the 
Great Moderation” (e.g., Giannone et al., 2008; Gali and Gambetti, 2009).
6 
                                                           
5 Roger W. Ferguson,  Asset Price Levels and Volatility: Causes and Implications, Remarks at the Banco de 
Mexico  International  Conference,  Mexico  City,  Mexico  November  15,  2005.  On  line  at: 
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/ speeches/2005/ 200511152/default.htm. 
6 Explanations for the Great Moderation vary from a better monetary policy, better inventory and supply chain 
management, more flexible labor markets, to… good luck.   5 
 
Among the main contributors to the dominant monetary theory, one can refer to Marc Gertler, 
Richard Clarida, Jordi Gali and Michael Woodford (see Clarida et al., 1999; Woodford 2003).
7 The 
three  equation  standard   model  mixed  new  classical -style  intertemporal  optimisation   by 
representative agents forming rational expectations, with a broader conception of the economy that 
owed much to the “Old” New Keynesian thinking (imperfect competition where firms have pricing 
power and prices are sticky). Many scholars point out that financial intermediations plays little role in 
this approach (Blanchard, 2009; Miller and Stiglitz, 2010). 
 
If these models describe well the dynamics of the economy when deviations from the equilibrium 
paths are small, they are not designed to analyze the consequences of a major crisis. In particular, 
they lack the basic blocks (financial sector) needed to analyze a major break in financial markets and 
the banking sector.
8 No surprise that if policymakers interpreted the early signals of the crisis as  a 
mere demand shock, a one percentage point reduction in the target interest rate would have solve 
the problem, according to results of the basic simulations performed at that time. As an example of 
extreme optimism with respect to the little relevance of US financial troubles for the Euro area 
economies, the ECB raised by ¼ point its interest rates in July 2008, on ly four month before the 
“Lehman earthquake”. 
 
Finally, a fourth myth that took a serious blow during this crisis is that of the useless state. As will be 
shown in the policy section, during the worst moments of the crisis, only the powerful intervention of 
central banks and governments allowed to restore trust in the financial system, and blocked the 
emergence of a systemic crisis. Yet this paper is not a plea in favour of “big government”. To the 
contrary,  it  will  be  shown  how  a  tolerant  attitude  toward  “fat”  financial  institutions  weakened 
competition in the banking sector in both the US and Europe and ultimately reduced the resilience of 
the sector to shocks. 
 
So this crisis taught us that the developed world is not insulated from the risk of quickly deteriorating 
beliefs, that financial risks cannot be easily spread, that financial shocks do have magnified effects on 
the  real  sector,  and  that  during  stormy  economic  periods,  governments  and  central  banks  can 
provide a worthy buffer, while in the long run they must protect competition in the banking sector. 
Whatever the future financial architecture of our societies, it will be grounded in these common 
sense principles unveiled by this crisis. 
 
Without pretending to provide a comprehensive explanation of the crisis, this paper aims at telling 
“the story of the crisis” in a concise way, bringing together interesting facts and some theories. After 
a close examination of the facts (Section 2), policies and regulation (Section 3), the conclusion will 
open the debate on what have we learnt from this crisis. 
2. Summary of the facts 
 
This Section aims at presenting the critical moments of the crisis in a chronological order, and to 
emphasize the most important shock amplification mechanisms. 
2.1 The burst of the real estate bubble and the subprime crisis 
 
Several factors combined to pave the way for emergence of a real estate bubble in the US in the late 
1990s,  as  property  prices  rose  rapidly.  Eventually  the  price  rises  became  self-perpetuating,  as 
                                                           
7 For an introduction to the New-Keynesian macroeconomic model, see Gali (2008). 
8 See Curdia and Woodford (2009) for an attempt to integrate credit market frictions in such a model.   6 
investors were buying houses on the expectation that home prices would further rise, and the prices 
were rising in response to ever-growing demand. Between 2000 and 2006, the national house price 
index more than doubled in the US (and regions such as Florida and California saw even higher rises). 
Among  the  factors  involved  were  reforms  introduced  in  the  1990s  by  the  US  administration  to 
encourage home ownership by poorer households, a sharp decline in mortgage transaction costs due 
to automatic calculation of the risk category, securitisation which enabled the banks to finance these 
loans more cheaply, and the US Federal Reserves’ extremely lax monetary policy after the dotcom 
bubble burst in 2001. 
 
 
Figure 1. US Case-Shiller Home Price Index 20 city composite, seasonally adjusted. 
Source: Standard and Poor’s 
 
In the US, most mortgages are granted either by non-specialist deposit banks or banks specialising in 
mortgage lending. The volume of new loans increased year after year, from USD 500 billion in 1995 
to USD 3,000 billion in 2006. Until 2003, most new mortgages were "prime conforming" and met 
strict  borrower  solvency  criteria  (income,  assets,  initial  deposit).  These  loans  were  then  mostly 
repurchased by two firms specialised in refinancing for mortgage issuers, known generally by their 
nicknames Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae.
9 Both are  Government Sponsored Entreprises (GSEs)  – 
private companies, but with strictly regulated activity – and their debt was implicitly covered by state 
guarantees. This status enabled them to raise funds on the bond market for years at interest rates 
close to Treasury bond rates. 
 
In response to policies to encourage private ownership, from the mid 1990s the banks began to grant 
“subprime” mortgage  loans  to  families with modest,  irregular  incomes, on terms  that  appeared 
tempting at first glance but could turn out to be extremely unfavourable if the base interest rate 
rose. In 2006, only 36% of new mortgages were “prime” loans (Kiff and Mills, 2007). Quite rationally, 
the banks thus sought a way of getting rid of these risks. As Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae were not 
authorised to repurchase these loans (or only a very small proportion of them), the commercial 
banks turned to securitisation, as a mean to “get rid” of the risk by transferring it to many investors. 
The method of securitisation implies that the credit institution groups together loans with a similar 
profile (maturity, risk category, etc), and then sells them to a special off balance sheet entity created 
for the purpose. This entity purchases the assets from the principal loan issuer by issuing Mortgage 
Backed Securities (MBS), i.e. bonds backed by the loans. When the mortgage issuer sells its loans to 
the  special  entity,  its  balance  sheet  total  decreases  and  in  view  of  its  equity  and  reserve 
                                                           
9  Freddie  Mac  is  “short  for”  Federal  Home  Loan  Mortgage  Corporation,  Fannie  Mae  for  Federal  National 



























































































































































































9  7 
requirements,  it  can  then  issue  further  loans.  The  bank  thus  transfers  to  this  entity  not  only 
management of the portfolio and the associated profit and loss, but also the risks. It makes an 
apparently risk-free profit on this transaction in the form of a commission (Diamond and Rajan, 2009; 
Brunnermeier, 2009). 
 
Interest on MBSs matches the interest on the loans, less administrative expenses. The purchaser of 
an MBS becomes the owner of the receivables, and agrees to bear (some or all of) the lender’s risk of 
default. 
 
One notable feature of MBSs is structuration.
10 Take the example of a loan portfolio financed by 
issuance of MBSs, all through an ad -hoc legal entity. Clearly, the lenders are in varying degrees  of 
solvency and/or will have to cope with varying falls in income in the event of a crisis. For example, for 
a 100-loan portfolio, the probability of default by one lender is very high, whereas the probability of 
default by all lenders is practically nil. This means it is possible to segment the entity’s liabilities into 
bond tranches with different levels of exposure to the risk of default. A first tranche (generally called 
equity) will bear all the initial losses, another tranche (mezzanine) will bear the following losses and 
so on, until we arrive at a tranche that is practically free of the risk of default, and this tranche can be 
attributed  the  highest  credit  rating,  generally  expressed  as  AAA.  The  riskiest  bonds  are  thus 
subordinated to the less risky bonds. 
 
Other important players in this crisis become involved at this stage: the ratings agencies. On the 
whole, the current financial system has handed over the assessment of the credit risk associated with 
debt  instruments  to  three  international  agencies,  Moody’s,  Standard  &  Poor’s  and  Fitch.  Banks 
engaging in mortgage securitisation asked these agencies for recommendations on the size of the 
tranches and the guarantees required to achieve the highest proportion of AAA securities. With 
hindsight, it is surprising that the risk on MBSs – a portfolio of loans – was assessed using the same 
rating scale as for debt instruments of industrial companies such as General Electric and Boeing. The 
financial market intermediaries’ demand for standardisation was apparently met in a particularly 
questionable  piece  of  prestidigitation.  Ratings  agencies  have  the  risks  for  industrial  businesses 
assessed by their analysts with reference to the firm's past record, whereas for the loan portfolios, 
they  used  quantitative  forecast  models  based  on  untested  assumptions  regarding  the  possible 
correlation of incidences of default inside the portfolio. Furthermore, as the score attributed by 
rating  agencies  is  supposed  to  be  independent  of  the  business  cycle,  assessment  also  required 
forecasting of possible future developments in the economic climate. At a time when real estate 
prices were rising, the agencies felt no pressure to take a more pessimistic outlook. 
 
To make things more complex and more opaque, investment banks and large commercial banks such 
as Citigroup moved into the very profitable business of setting up Structured Investment Vehicle 
(SIV), as special off balance sheet entities, to purchase various very high-risk MBSs by issuing bonds 
under the same structuring principle. The balance sheet liabilities of SIVs thus showed bonds named 
Collateralized Debt Obligations or CDOs, whose highest tranches once again got the top credit rating 
AAA. Again, the tranches of risk were calculated on the basis of arbitrary assumptions regarding 
correlation between any default on the various assets in the entity’s portfolio. 
 
As already mentioned, another financial instrument that has played a major role in this crisis is the 
Credit Default Swap (CDS). When first created in the late 1990s, CDSs were based on a simple idea: 
the aim was to enable the buyer of a bond issued by a given company to hedge against the risk of 
                                                           
10  See  Coval  et  al.  (2009)  and  Ashcraft  and  Schuermann  (2008)  for  an  introduction  to  the  economics  of 
structured finance.   8 
default by that company – the counterparty risk.
11 This is possible if another agent agrees to bear this 
risk, in return for  remuneration. And so CDSs appeared as  over-the-counter contracts between a 
seller and a buyer of protection against the default by a third party on its debts. The third party (or 
reference entity) may be a company, a government, a local administration, or an ad-hoc investment 
vehicle financing the purchase of Asset Backed Securities (particularly MBSs) through the issuance of 
CDOs. The terms of such contracts range from two to ten years. The contract’s notional value is the 
face value of the bonds covered by this form of insurance. The principal payment is triggered by a 
credit event. For example, if a firm goes bankrupt, the value of bonds it issued may collapse.
12 
Depending on the type of contract, the seller of the CDS undertakes either to pay the purchas er the 
difference between the bond’s face value and residual value, or pay the full face value in exchange 
for the bonds concerned. The protection buyer agrees to pay the seller a premium throughout the 
term of the contract, except in the event of default, in which case payment is suspended. 
 
While ten years ago the notional value of CDSs was negligible, it shot up to a peak of USD 62 trillion 
at the end of 2007, which was five times the US GDP, or more than worldwide GDP. The massive 
increase  in  the  volume  of  CDSs  is  explained  by  an  increasing  need  for  protection  in  times  of 
uncertainty, the speculation that developed around the CDS product, and the decentralised nature of 
the market, making consolidation of cross-hedging impossible. In late 2007 in particular, many banks 
that had purchased MBSs and CDOs sought to acquire protection by purchasing CDS hedges.  
 
2.2 From the subprime crisis to the banking crisis 
 
The first tensions were felt in mid-2006, when the rising trend in US real estate prices abruptly 
reversed after a series of interest rate rises (Figure 1). A high interest rate and falling prices turned 
out to be an explosive cocktail, causing a speedy increase in the default rate on subprime mortgages. 
With this turn of events it became clear that the ratings agencies had greatly underestimated the 
probability of a real estate market collapse, and that CDOs based on subprime-type loans were 
considerably riskier than implied by their risk rating. Consequently, the risk rating for many AAA debt 
backed instruments was suddenly taken down several grades, a step never taken before for industrial 
corporations’ credit ratings (industrial firms are fairly often downgraded, but generally only by one 
notch at a time). 
 
The vast complexity of credit instruments (which are not necessarily technically complex, but are 
legally complex due to the diversity of contracts involved) and the “chaotic” growth specific to the 
bubble  had  enhanced  opacity  in  financial  transaction.  Trusting  the  ratings  agencies,  the  banks 
involved in production of structured products and the banks that had purchased those products had 
unquestioningly accepted the attributed risk rating as true. This blind trust is all the more surprising 
in large banks, which have their own powerful risk analysis centres. When the alarm bells started 
ringing,  it  was  already  too  late:  the  holders  of  these  securities  realised  with  horror  that  their 
potential purchasers had vanished and the value of the assets was in freefall. 
 
The US (and British) banks that had participated in MBS and CDO issues with high subprime content 
had retained a substantial share in their accounts, or had to hurriedly bring the SIVs they had set up 
back onto their balance sheets.  This resulted in a sudden deterioration of their financial position. A 
                                                           
11 Unlike shares, where the holder can resort to derivatives to cover himself against a variation in their value, 
the only way for a bond holder to protect himself against a foreseen increase in the risk of default was to sell 
the bond. 
12 In normal times, th e average rate of recovery is 50% of face value; this can fall to 20% in a period of 
recession.   9 
mortgage lending bank as large as Countrywide, for example, found itself on the brink of disaster and 
was ultimately absorbed in July 2008 by Bank of America. 
 
But the real trouble began when investors began to ask who in fact owned the dubious assets. 
Analysts expected to find the US banks in the front line. They realised, as successive financial results 
for the first quarter of 2008 were released, that several German, French, Swiss, Belgian and other 
banks had purchased millions of dollars’ worth of CDOs of US origin, and were now obliged to set 
aside significant provisions for impairment losses. These banks had probably been attracted by AAA-
grade securities offering a slightly higher interest rate than AAA-grade industrial bonds. Regulation in 
force  in  Europe  also  provided  strong  incentives  for  bank  to  hold  AAA  assets  on  their  books, 
irrespective of the composition of these assets. 
 
But how could each bank’s degree of ownership in the dubious assets be observed? And ultimately, 
what was the true value of these assets, for which the secondary market had disappeared in most 
cases? Obviously, it was very much in the interest of banks with high exposure to this type of asset to 
play down their problems in order to obtain better financing terms  (especially on the interbank 
market). Of course, good banks claimed that their exposure is low. Yet, as long as there was no 
“definitive” tool to sort out good from bad banks, doubt created a risk premium that applied to all 
banks, and harmed in particular the good ones.
13 
 
The world finally remembered that trust is a bank’s most important asset. As long as customers and 
creditors have confidence in a bank, it can finance its loans and other investments undisturbed. But if 
that  confidence  disappears,  the  bank  encounters  liquidity  difficulties  that  can  turn  out  to  be 
insurmountable. 
 
The crisis has unveiled a new dimension of the contemporary financial architecture. Over time, banks 
and the other financial institutions (insurance companies, hedge funds, pension funds, etc) become 
more interconnected, with an increasing number of financial institutions keeping on their balance 
sheet assets such as public and corporate bonds as well as CDOs whose value was covered by CDS-
type insurance sold by other financial institutions. This increased interdependency is a powerful 
shock amplification mechanism. If some liabilities of one bank guarantee the assets hold by a second 
bank, any risk on the viability of the former bank has a bearing on the market value of the latter. If 
one seller of CDS protection is pushed out of the market, all the banks that bought this protection 
will be directly exposed to the risk of default by the reference entities covered by these CDS. 
 
In an environment of increasing interdependency between banks, default by one bank can bring 
about default of partner banks, whose default would stress their own partners, etc. In theory, a 
systemic crisis is defined as a situation in which the individual probability of default increases with 
the cumulative frequency of default in the sector. The context where a systemic crisis can occur has 
long been well-known.
14 Unfortunately, the myth  according to which securitisation would enable 
banks to parcel up and spread mortgage risks to a mass of investors supposed to be more resilient to 
macroeconomic shocks seems to have undermined the economists’ warnings that strict management 
was required for the risk on bank loans. The principle of spreading the risk is probably appropriate, 
but the tolerable limit on how much to transfer was far exceeded. 
 
                                                           
13 See Besancenot and Vranceanu (2010) for a formal model of banking communication in times of crisis that 
emphasizes how difficult it is for investors to assess the true exposure to risky assets of a given bank from its 
official messages. 
14 There is a vast body of literature, but we can single out the classic bank run model developed by Diamond 
and Dybvig (1983), and the interbank market panic model proposed by Rochet and Tirole (1996).   10 
In fact, for a short period in the summer of 2008, there was a tangible risk of bank runs in Europe. As 
early  as  February  2008,  following  massive  deposit  withdrawals  the  UK  government  nationalised 
Northern Rock, a high leverage bank that was extensively involved in mortgage lending in the US and 
UK,  and  decided  to  raise  the  guarantee  for  customer  deposits.  Under  escalating  pressure  from 
savers,  who  were  beginning  to  withdraw  their  money,  Ireland  decided  in  September  2008  to 
guarantee all bank deposits (a technically impossible commitment as total deposits were equivalent 
to 200% of this small country’s GDP). This reform led to a flood of deposit transfers from other banks 
into Irish banks, and so in October 2008, the other European countries had to raise their guarantee 
levels as well. 
 
As everyone was under suspicion, another phenomenon arose: the interbank market gradually dried 
up, with the emergence of a substantial spread between the rate on collateralised loans by the 
central banks and the interbank rate at which banks make uncollateralized loans to each other (short 
term, particularly 3 months). Banks on both sides of the Atlantic began to have enormous cash flow 
problems as they ran out of short-term financing sources (they could no longer issue certificates of 
deposit). The more a bank used short-term debt, the greater its difficulties. Unsurprisingly, the most 
affected were the large Wall Street investment banks, which had neither stable resources in the form 
of  deposits  nor  access  to  Fed  financing  facilities,  and  were  operating  with  considerably  higher 




In March 2008, Bear Sterns was the first to be absorbed by JP Morgan Chase. In September 2008, 
Merrill Lynch was taken over by the leading US commercial bank, Bank of America. But just then a 
genuine wave of panic was triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Lehman Brothers was a 
bank with an impressive portfolio of MBSs and CDOs; at the time, the notional value of the CDSs it 
had sold was estimated at USD 400 billion.
15 
 
This panic is easy to understand today, as it looked as though neither  the size nor the strength of its 
network could guarantee the survival of a financial institution. Financial market operators’ fears were 
greatly accentuated by the enormous volume of outstanding CDSs: for the first time, investors began 
to doubt the ability of sellers of protection to honour their commitments (FASB, 2009), and this had a 
                                                           
15 Once in liquidation, it came to light that Lehman Brothers had hedged against the risk of default of the 
reference entities, by buying CDSs from other banks; the total value of CDS payments made, net of payments 
received, was only USD 6 billion, a small amount given the bank’s size and quality. 
BOX: The organization of the banking sectors in the US and Europe 
Following the Great Depression, the US instated a distinction between investment banks and 
commercial (or deposit) banks. The founding rule of this separation was the Glass-Steagall Act, 
passed in 1933. In the late period the rule was overcame by many large banks, and was finally 
abrogated in 1999 by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. By 2007, equity finance transactions (i.e. 
those  undertaken  on  behalf  of  other  firms,  such  as  IPOs,  mergers  and  acquisitions,  bond 
issues, securitisation) were generally confined to five large Wall Street investment banks (Bear 
Sterns, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers) and a small number 
of very large banks with more diversified profiles, such as Citigroup or JP Morgan-Chase. The 
investment  banks  did  not  collect  deposits,  financing  their  business  growth  through  their 
(sometimes enormous) profits, stock issues and above all, huge amounts of debt. On the other 
side, commercial banks do collect deposits; they vary widely in size, often only operating in a 
certain  regional  area,  sometimes  specialising  in  specific  types  of  loans:  industrial  loans, 
agricultural  loans,  mortgages,  etc.  The  large  banks  in  Europe,  however,  have  a  diversified 
profile, mixing commercial and investment activities: they collect deposits and issue debt, grant 
loans and carry out transactions and investment activities on behalf of businesses.   11 
knock-on effect on the perceived financial health of entities that had hedged against default on 
various assets in their portfolio (such as MBS or CDOs) by buying CDSs. 
 
Reflecting this general loss of confidence, the spread on the interbank market reached new heights 
(almost two percentage points on 3-month credit in November 2008 – see figure 7) and so did the 
CDS premium for financial institutions (figure 8). Speculative attacks then shook Morgan Stanley, 
which  in  November  2008  saw  its  stock  market  value  tumble  and  only  stabilise  after  the  US 
government’s promise that it would not let collapse any other large and interconnected financial 
institution.  
 
Finally,  the  same  month,  the  surviving  investment  banks  (Morgan  Stanley  and  Goldman  Sachs) 
changed their status to that of a deposit bank, which meant they could collect deposits and obtain 
refinancing from the Fed, but placed them under stricter ratio requirements and an obligation for 
greater transparency regarding their transactions and the state of their finances. The traditional 
investment bank model has not therefore survived this crisis (Pomfret, 2010). 
 
In the meantime, other serious shocks were associated with partial default by insurance companies 
involved in the production of MBSs and CDOs, such as the monoline insurers Ambac and MBIA, and 
in particular the US insurance giant AIG. While the traditional divisions of AIG have always been 
profitable, in the early 2000s the investment arm of the company became extensively involved in the 
CDS market. The total value of protection sold by AIG to various banks and hedge funds on reference 
entities with high subprime content was some USD 440 billion. When the CDOs value started to slide 
down, AIG had to pay the difference between the notional value and the residual value, and saw all 
its  capital  melting  away.  If  AIG  had  gone  bankrupt,  many  banks  all over  the  world  would  have 
suffered enormous losses given their own liabilities to third parties. AIG was thus kept alive with 
massive cash injections from the US government, receiving USD 144 billion in state aid in the period 
to August 15, 2009.
16 
 
The Government Sponsored Enterprises specialized in mortgage refinancing, Freddie Mac and Fannie 
Mae, which had gradually increased their amount of subprime loans under  political influence, saw 
their equity melt away and were at serious risk of not being able to  roll-on their maturing debt. In 
September  2008,  the  government  thus  took  both  organisations  into  public  management  and 
committed to an investment that had reached USD 111 billion until January 2010. Meanwhile, in an 
unusual move, the Fed decided to purchase the bonds issued by them directly (for a maximum of 
USD 200 billion). 
 
Between July 2007 and the end of 2008, the stock market values of banks and financial institutions 
fell by approximately 70% (compared to the general index downturn of 45%).  Many CEOs were 
dismissed. Jobs were frozen. With a catastrophic fourth quarter in 2008 (substantial losses), annual 
profits for close to 8,500 US deposit banks registered with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) and some 7,500 European banks were close to zero in 2008.
17 In the banks, the sector most 
affected is specific to investment banks and concerns securitisation and structured products.  Other 
sectors, however,  stood  in relatively good health:   the standard deposit and loa ns business has 
suffered little and so did foreign exchange and commodity brokerage; mergers and acquisitions also 
hold up well. 
 
                                                           
16 See The Toxic Trio, The Economist, August 15, 2009. 
17  See  Financial  Stability  Review,  June  2009,  European  Central  Bank,  www.ecb.int/  pub/pdf/other/ 
financialstabilityreview200906en.pdf  et  Quarterly  Banking  Profile,  First  Quarter  2009,  FDIC, 
www2.fdic.gov/qbp/2009mar/qbp.pdf.   12 
 
Figure 2. US: Total number of commercial banks registered with the FDIC and number of failed 
institutions. Source: FDIC Statistical Database 
 
 
Figure 3. US: Bank quarterly net income in billions of USD. 
Source: FDIC Quarterly Banking Profile 
 
2.3 From the banking crisis to the real crisis 
 
Another economic myth, circulated before and at the beginning of the crisis, put forward the idea of 
the  separation  between  the  financial  and  the  real  sector.  Economists  have  long  believed  that 
problems in the financial sector could only have a small effect on the real economy and that a slight 
adjustment to monetary policy would be enough to put things right. As already mentioned in the 
Introduction,  the  dominant  New-Keynsian macroeconomic model  (Clarida  et al.  1999; Woodford 
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Securities and Other Gains/Losses Net  13 




Events showed the optimism behind this second myth  to be ill-founded. In 2009, most economies 
registered GDP declines on a scale not seen since the last  World War (real growth rates for 2009 
were  of  -2.5% in the United States,  -5.3% in Japan and  -3.9% in the Euro Area) End of 2009, 
unemployment reached 10% in both  the US and the Euro Area. All over the world, inflation fell 
significantly to a worrying zero, partly because of the decline in oil and commodity prices, but also in 




Figure 4. GDP growth rates in annual percent change. 
Source: World Economic Outlook, IMF 2010. 
 
 
Figure 5. Unemployment in percent of labor force. Source: Eurostat 
 
                                                           
18 Its microeconomic foundations are also subject to criticism. According to Blanchard (2010), two of its three 
main equations are just wrong. To find a relevant analysis of interactions between the financial sector and the 
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The main factor behind the real crisis should be sought in the psychology of the economic agents. All 
the modern theories support Keynes’ intuition that the actual economic outcome depend to a large 
extent on individuals’ state of mind. More in detail, if businesses and households expect a downturn 
in the near future, the former stop investing, and the latter stop spending and save more. The 
resulting  higher  unemployment  and  excess  production  capacities  simply  accentuate  the  initial 
pessimism and a vicious circle forms. 
 
Between mid-2007 and the end of 2008, most of the major US and European stock market indexes 
receded by approximately 45%. The plummeting value of assets in the form of equities may also 
encourage households to save more and therefore spend less. This negative “wealth effect” should 
have been more pronounced in the US than in Europe, for in the US much of the money put aside for 
pensions is managed by pension funds which themselves invested some of their capital in equities. 
 
 
Figure 6. Stock market evolutions in the Euro area, Japan and the US. January 2003 = 100. 
Source: World Economic Outlook, IMF 2010. 
 
Another important factor was the impact of bursting real estate bubbles (in the US, Spain, the UK and 
Ireland). The readjustment in housing prices has been accompanied by a serious downturn in the 
construction industry, negatively affecting employment in the sector and with an indirect impact on 
related sectors. 
 
With banks becoming more cautious, they tightened up loan conditions. Faced with a crisis in which 
one essential cause was poor assessment of the risk of borrower default, the banks strive to make 
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2.4. The way out of the crisis 
 
There has been widespread mobilisation in response to this crisis. The private sector has begun 
extensive restructuring and the public authorities have reacted forcefully, in ways described in the 
following section. 
 
To complete our chronology of events, the global recovery that begun in the second part of 2009, is 
confirmed in early 2010. In April the IMF issued a rather optimistic world growth forecast for 2010 of 
4.5% but also called attention that the recovery will be uneven, with emerging economies faring 
better than many developed countries (IMF, 2010). 
 
Most importantly, in the summer of 2009 the financial markets have gained a new lease of life (BIS, 
2009). The spread on the interbank market has returned to normal levels, and most banks reported 
positive net income for the second quarter of 2009 (Figure 7). The CDS spread on financial firms 
declined since on both sides of the Atlantic (Figure 8).
19 The stock market value of banking entities 
more than doubled between  its lowest point in March and the end of July, and most of the major 




Figure 7.  Interbank spreads in basis points 
Source: World Economic Outlook, IMF 2010. 
 
                                                           
19 The CDS spread is the cost of insuring the protection buyer against the default by the reference entity, in this 
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Figure 8. Bank CDS spreads in basis points (ten-year; median) 
Source: World Economic Outlook, IMF 2010. 
 
The CDS catastrophe predicted in autumn 2008 has not come to pass. Many adjustments were made 
by the market players themselves. The notional value hedged by CDSs (USD 62 trillion in 2007) fell to 
USD 30 trillion by the end of 2009, chiefly due to consolidation of cross-hedges. 
 
 
Figure 9. Notional amount of CDS outstanding in billions of USD. 
Source: ISDA Market Survey 
 
If by many dimensions the crisis was over at the beginning of 2010, it will leave marks that will take 
time to disappear, or even worse, could originate the next crisis. In particular, the policy responses to 
the crisis were so ambitious that any adjustment to the normal level could prove to be extremely 
painful. The deterioration of fiscal policies in many countries should push up interest rates and thus 
take a toll on long-term growth prospects. Some governments are not exempt of the insolvency risk. 
3. How public authorities managed the crisis 
 
In the last few years that preceded the crisis, the deregulation doctrine seemed to accommodate 
well  with  a  relatively  steady  growth,  low  inflation and  prosperity  in  many countries  (as  already 
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forth and last myth emerged, according to which governments are harmful or, at best, useless. If we 
listened to the Fed Chairman, Alan Greenspan, in 2005: 
 
Whether by intention or by happenstance, many, if not most, governments in recent decades have 
been relying more and more on the forces of the marketplace and reducing their intervention in 
market  outcomes.  We  appear  to  be  revisiting  Adam  Smith's  notion  that  the  more  flexible  an 
economy the greater its ability to self-correct after inevitable, often unanticipated disturbances. That 
greater  tendency  toward  self-correction  has  made  the  cyclical  stability  of  an  economy  less 
dependent on the actions of macroeconomic policy makers, whose responses often have come too 
late or have been misguided.
20 
 
This myth also took a serious blow during this crisis.  For sure, before the crisis  public authorities 
played a contradictory role. A certain lack of vigilance on their part (by the competition authorities in 
particular) allowed some financial institutions to grow to such a  size that their bankruptcy would 
have destabilised the entire financial market (as was the case for Lehman Brothers, and could have 
been the case if AIG had fallen).   In the US, t he public policy for encouraging home ownership 
irrespective of the financial health of the borrower was another contributing factor. But during the 
crisis it also became clear that the public authorities were the only players capable of effective action 
against troubles mainly caused by a general loss of trust in financial firms. Doubtless with hindsight, 
some measures will be seen as excessive  (such as the huge public deficits in  many  European 
countries and the US) and others as useless. It must nonetheless be acknowledged that in the short-
run the cumulative effect of these  measures successfully achieved the essential objective of  re-
establishing confidence in the financial sector and   the economic system as a whole, and thus 
contained the magnitude of the social losses. 
 
The aim of this section is to briefly present the more traditional measures used to shore up demand 
and specific measures adopted to rebuild confidence in the banking sector, bearing in mind that the 
effects of the two types of measure were mutually reinforcing. 
3.1 Pushing up global demand 
 
As already stressed, the financial crisis ultimately caused a downswing in global demand. Meanwhile, 
oil and commodity prices fell sharply, leading to a rapid decline in inflation worldwide. Given that 
price stability was not at stake, the governments and central banks were thus able to introduce 
traditional economic stimulus measures in a purely Keynesian approach. 
 
In terms of monetary policy, the major central banks significantly reduced their target interest rates. 
The Fed target rate was pushed down from 5.25% in 2007 to 0-0.25% in December 2008, a first in the 
US. The Bank of England adopted a similar policy. The European Central Bank (ECB) also reduced its 
main refinancing rate, from 4.25% in July 2008 to 1% in May 2009. For the first time in their modern 




As far as fiscal policy is concerned, in the US the Bush administration brought in a significant tax cut 
in 2008. In February 2009, the new Obama administration introduced a USD 787 billion 2-year rescue 
package comprising spending to improve infrastructures and scientific research, public grants (for 
health, education, and protection for the unemployed), and tax cuts for households and businesses. 
                                                           
20 Alan Greenspan International imbalances, Remarks before the Advancing Enterprise Conference, London, 
England, December 2, 2005www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/200512022/default.htm. 
21 Notice that the dominant New Keynesian model used for monetary policy analysis and simulation has little to 
say about the impact of measures other than changes in the interest rate.   18 
Across  the  Atlantic,  in  December  2008  European  Union  member  states  adopted  a  coordinated 
stimulus plan worth 1.5% of their combined GDP (€ 200 billion). 
 
The strong demand stimulus helped avoiding an even sharper decline in activity in all countries, and 
through the export channel, contributed to stabilize the global economy. It also helped stabilizing the 
financial sectors by limiting the number of bankruptcies (and thus the losses for those banks that sold 
CDS on these companies). 
 
Unfortunately, this generous State support came with a cost: deficits reached record heights in many 
countries, and pushed public debts on untested time path. In the past, Japan has showed that a 
developed country can live for many years with a debt to GDP ratio as high as 175%. Yet the world 
has changed after 2009. Today all governments aim at financing high and rising amounts of debts 
(see Table). Many (European) countries are heading toward the 100% debt to GDP threshold within 
the next two years. According to official forecasts, the US public debt could reach 90% by 2020 
(Bohn, 2010). So governments must compete for an amount of savings that has no particular reason 
to rise in a significant way. Nervous investors are watching for the slightest sign of weakness to ask 
for higher risk premia. 
 
 
Public deficit  Public debt 
United States   - 11.9  60 
Japon   - 7.7  192 
Selected EU countires 
UK   - 14.5  68.5 
France   - 7.5  79.7 
Germany   - 4.6  77.2 
Italy   - 5.3  115.2 
EU “high risk” countries (as of April 2010) 
Portugal   - 6.7  77.4 
Ireland   - 12.2  65.8 
Greece   - 12.7  112.6 
Spain   - 9.6  54.9 
Table 1: Public debt and public deficit as a percentage of GDP in 
selected high-income countries, 2009. Source: OECD and CIA Factbook 
 
In mid 2010, Greece faced huge difficulties in refinancing some tranches of its 120% of GDP debt and 
only  a  coordinated  action  at  the  EU  level  allowed  to  avoid  immediate  default  (before  the 
intervention, the two-year interest rate on Greek debt reached 12%). The intervention involved an 
EU managed 110 billion euro loan to Greece, which entered under the IMF monitoring process for 
distressed  countries,  and  a  dramatic  decision  of  the  ECB  to  start  buying  sovereign  debt  (they 
probably bough substantial amounts of Greek debt). 
   19 
Investors seem to be particularly worried about the sustainability of public debts of Spain, Portugal 
and Ireland, in particular due to the modest credibility of their deficit reduction plans. In June 2010 
the European Union has created a Special Investment Vehicle with the purpose of borrowing euros in 
the  international  marketplace  with  a  440  billion  euros  guarantee  provided  by  fiscally  sounder 
countries (and some 150 billion from the IMF), in order to lend money to those governments that 
may face temporary difficulties in financing their debt. 
3.2 Restoring trust 
 
Much has been written about the measures taken to rebuild confidence, as they ventured off the 
beaten  track  trodden  by  the  usual  action  in  macroeconomic  crises.  To  be  fair,  most  of  these 
measures were inspired by the policies implemented by the Nordic countries during their 1990s 
banking system crisis. A distinction can be drawn, for the purposes of presentation, between action 
by governments and action by the central banks, although in all countries these bodies acted in 
coordination. 
 
One of the US government's initial reactions was to attack the root of the problem, i.e. the rise in the 
default rate on subprime mortgage loans. In compliance with the Bush administration’s December 
2007 plan, the poorest households were allowed to amend the terms of their loans and benefit from 
the  special  promotional  interest  rate  for  longer  than  initially  promised  (generally  two years).  In 
February 2009, the new US administration decided to reinforce support for the most exposed home-
owners, to stem the wave of default and repossession. Unfortunately, these measures do not seem 
to have been very effective, as the income of the households fell further than predicted. 
 
For deposit banks, reserves equivalent to more than 8% of loans outstanding is generally perceived 
as proof of good risk management (this thumb rule is in line with the former Basel I regulation, still in 
force for US banks). A large number of US and European banks had to write off losses resulting from 
the plummeting value of the CDOs they held, and saw their equity fall below the accepted level.
22 
Several banks tried to raise funds on the private market to restore their capital, but the success of 
the exercise was very limited in the height of the crisis. 
 
Two types of public interventions are possible to improve a bank’s solvency ratio: either buying the 
bank’s dubious assets at a high enough price, or supplying new equity, for instance by acquiring a 
shareholding. It is possible to do both simultaneously. 
 
In September 2008, the US administration launched the Troubled Assets Relief Programme (TARP), 
with an initial budget of USD 700 billion with the aim of buying such “toxic assets”. But this measure 
could not be implemented, as there was no effective way of valuing these assets following the 
disappearance of the secondary market. Only Switzerland has set up a “bad bank”, which purchased 
€25 billion of toxic assets from UBS in 2008. 
 
So,  following  the  British  example,  at  the  end  of  2008  the  US  government  and  most  European 
governments decided to recapitalise banks whose falling reserves were dangerously increasing the 
risk of insolvency. The principal method used was the purchase of preference shares (or more rarely, 
ordinary shares). 
 
                                                           
22 According to IMF estimates (as to April 2010), the banking system write-off from the onset of the crisis 
through 2010 reached the “astronomic” figure of 2.3 trillion USD (IMF 2010). 
   20 
More in detail, in the US, the government modified the TARP to allow USD 700 billion to be used for 
bank recapitalisation under its Capital Purchase Program. In the period to March 31, 2009, some 500 
banks had benefited from capital injections (through preference shares). An important moment in 
the management of the crisis came when ten major banks that had received public funding decided 
to reimburse the money in June 2009. By January 2010, most of the banks have reimbursed the 
public money, and the expected total bill on this programme should not exceed 90 billions dollars 




It should be emphasized that in the US, the government focused its efforts on saving or facilitating 
successful absorbing of major Wall Street investment banks, and a small number of giants from the 
financial sector (the insurance company AIG, the bank Citigroup and the  specialized firms Freddie 
Mac and Fannie Mae), but did not intervene to save  commercial banks on the brink of insolvency. 
European governments have taken their support for banks to extremes in an attempt to prevent any 
bankruptcy, even for second-class banks. This happened to Northern Rock in England, which was 
nationalised as a matter of urgency. Hypo Real Estate and IKW in Germany (a public bank), as well as 
the Franco-Belgian bank Dexia, received substantial inputs of public capital that helped them to 
narrowly avoid filing for bankruptcy. The French government provided a substantial amount of funds 
to the main four  national banks, although it was not obvious that these banks  did face insolvency 
problems; this move has probably discouraged potential buyers for these firms. 
 
Apart from the threat of insolvency, banks had to cope with difficulties in financing their short-term 
operations. As already mentioned, the interbank credit market (where banks lend and borrow cash 
between them) dried up in the aftermath of Lehman’s banckrupcy. To support this market, many 
governments have set-up public guarantees for short-term interbank loans. In 2010 all countries 
terminated these guarantees, without having spent one penny. 
 
Turning now to central bank’s action, they rose to the challenge in their role as supplier of liquidity in 
a crisis situation (or “lender of last resort”). As operations dried up on the interbank market where 
banks seek short-term financing, the central banks decided to step in to bolster the market. For so 
doing, in the US, banks were invited to apply to the Fed for collateralised loans within the framework 
of  the  “discount  window”  facility,  and  the  term  of  those  loans  was  extended  to  three months. 
Meanwhile the ECB gradually raised the volume of liquidity available to banks through traditional 
one-week  reverse-repo operations  and  broadened the  range  of acceptable  collateral;  in  a more 
                                                           
23 Cheap as chips, The Economist, January 16th, 2010. 
BOX 2: Preferred shares 
This type of share pays regular fixed dividends, operating in the same way as a bond coupon 
except that there is no final maturity. Preference shares rank higher than ordinary shares for 
dividend payments and in the event of liquidation following bankruptcy, but do not carry voting 
rights. This cannot really be considered as “nationalisation” even though in some cases the 
government  has  become  the  majority  contributor  to  banks’  equity.  In  proceeding  to 
recapitalisation through issuance of preference shares, the governments have negotiated high 
dividends  and  imposed  restrictions  on  management  salaries  and  dividend  distribution  to 
ordinary shareholders; this gives the banks a strong incentive to repurchase the shares at the 
end  of  the  minimum  period  stipulated  in  the  contract  (generally  5  years).  Given  the  fixed-
dividend structure, the market value of these shares varies inversely with the market interest 
rate, and therefore the shareholder cannot benefit from any increase in the firm’s market value. 
To remedy this, the preference shares generally have warrants attached for subscription of one 
ordinary share at a predefined price, so that if the ordinary share rises in value, its owner (here 
the government) can make a capital gain.   21 
spectacular move, they extended the duration of longer-term credits up to one year, and let banks 
freely decide on the amount they want to borrow. 
 
The Fed (and the Bank of England) also adopted a whole set of more unconventional measures to 
support credit development in a context where they could not further reduce the short term interest 
rate once that it reached the zero thresholds. For example, it decided to make three-month loans to 
money market investment funds, agreed to purchase 3-month debt certificates issued by sound non-
financial firms, bought some of the debt of the Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, and end up by buying 
long-term treasury bonds. The direct result of these measures has been an unprecedented increase 
in the balance sheet value of the central banks. 
 
By 2010 time has come to unwind the generous support of the central bank to commercial banks and 
other exceptional measures, without imposing too much stress on financial markets. Consensus of 
central bankers is to give up to all special programmes that are no longer used by banks. The US and 
the UK ceased their programmes of buying long-term Treasury bonds. The European and mainly 
Greek debt problems confronted the ECB with a difficult dilemma. While in 2009 the ECB indicated 
that long-term repo operations should be terminated, in April 2010 they postponed indefinitely this 
decision. Furthermore, they agreed on directly buying sovereign debt on the secondary market, a 
measure that contradicts if not the legal framework, at least the verbal commitment of the ECB to 
Bundesbank style rigor. The fact that at the same time the euro depreciated sharply against the 
dollar is probably more than a coincidence. Some observers surmised that the ECB decision was 
driven mainly by political pressure to rescue European banks that hold the largest chunk of Greek 
debt. 
 
One  important  lesson  from  this  crisis  management  episode  is  the  positive  contribution  of 
governments  and  central  banks  in  the  late  2008  by  immediately  mending  any  market  short  of 
liquidity. The most important consequence of this resolute action was a clear signal sent to market 
players: that the government or the central bank would not let the system collapse even if ultimately 
they must take the losses. The signal was credible enough to restore trust and the good functioning 
of the markets; hence the public authorities had not to bear any substantial losses. 
 
It must be seen whether this massive rescue plan will prompt financial institutions to take even 
higher risks in the years to come, what many observers refer to as the moral hazard problem. More 
worrisome, some European governments, but also the US might have pushed the spending lever too 
much.  An  adjustment  in  the  fiscal  position  is  now  unavoidable,  since  investors  will  sanction  all 
governments that cannot commit on a sustainable public debt path. But such adjustments come with 
their own costs in terms of postponed growth. 
 
3.3. Regulation of the financial system 
 
A last dimension of public action is regulation, or the design of a set of rules aiming to support the 
fluidity and transparency of market trades. The main role of intelligent regulation is to prevent crises, 
or in the terms used in the introduction, to make sure that bad equilibria cannot arise. The 2007-
2009 crisis was interpreted by many observers as the result of a shortage of regulation in financial 
markets. Others pointed out that many current difficulties stem precisely from the existing regulation 
or public intervention. 
 
Probably, both experts make an interesting point. Clearly, antitrust regulation is much needed in a 
financial sector where barriers to entry are substantial (Stiglitz, 2010). Some regulation might be 
needed to reduce the amount of risk born by banks in normal times and to enhance transparency.   22 
Yet,  the  design  of  such  regulation  is  not  an  easy  task,  as  long  as  nothing  guarantees  that  the 
regulators have better information about risks inside the system than private agents. To take an 
example, the regulation in force in the 2000s was broadly based on those risk grades issued by rating 
agencies,  which  were  considered  infallible  by  the  public  authorities.  As  a  consequence,  many 
European banks have filled their books with triple-A CDOs that turned out to be worthless. Should 
banks have been free to choose the measure of risk, these mistakes could have been avoided. 
 
In normal times, banks are extremely opaque institutions and this opacity is part of their business 
model (Morgan, 2002). As already mentioned, during the crisis, the incapacity to sort good form bad 
institutions brought about substantial financial distress. One important tool used during this crisis to 
address this imperfect information challenge was stress tests. More in detail, in the late 2008, the US 
Fed undertook the process of screening the operation risk of the large financial institutions (for 19 
largest banks with respect to managed assets) and was followed on a short notice by European 
governments. Basically, such tests provide empirical estimate of the additional capital banks should 
hold in order to survive to a catastrophic scenario. Of course, the outcome depends to a large extent 
on the nature and size of the simulated shock. For instance, the US tests considered under the most 
averse scenario a substantial decline in GDP (more than 3%), persistent unemployment at 10% and a 
further decline in housing prices. fall in GDP of 10% over the next year.
24  When in Mai 2009 the 
results of these tests were made public and appeared to be extremely positive  for a majority of the 
19 banks under scrutiny , the last tensions existing in the marke t disappeared. The US regulator 
decided to disclose the additional capit al requirement needed to co pe with the most adverse 
scenario for each bank. The European regulator  communicated only an average grade and a global 
qualitative assessment, considering  at that time that  disclosing bank-specific information is an 
uncompetitive practice. 
 
The tension between the US and the EU regulators with respect to the “transparency” vs. “industrial 
protection” rose gradually. In June 2010 the EU ended up by authorizing the Committee of European 
Bank Supervision to communicate results of the stress tests for each bank (a move first unilaterally 
undertaken by Spain), but it not clear yet whether national legislation will allow for this measure to 
be implemented. At the same time, many observers question the validity of a stress test that rules 
out the possibility of default on public debt by a euro-area member country. 
 
These days many expert national and international organizations are delivering an important effort 
of understanding this crisis and contribute to draft the rules of a new financial architecture. Main 
goals are to improve the overall transparency of the financial markets and operations, including 
fighting  tax  evasion  and money  laundering  via tax  havens,  improving  the  quality  of  information 
provided by the main players, limiting the amount of risk borne by banks, improving the supervision 
of the financial system. 
 
Despite  the  populist  rhetoric  of  some  political  leaders,  in  general  governments  appear  to  have 
confidence in the banking system’s ability to learn from past errors and adopt better management 
practices. As a consequence, they are not necessarily seeking to extend constraints much beyond the 
measures already accepted or introduced by the profession. Most proposed measures aim at limiting 
the amount of risk that banks can take (and, due to the standard trade-off between risk and return, 
also limit their profits). 
 
The Basel Committee and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) have stepped up their 
work to give greater consideration to risk, particularly in relation to off balance sheet entities. A 
significant action in the realm of financial regulation is being carried out by the G20 within the 
                                                           
24 See: The Supervisory Capital Assessment Program: Design and Implementation, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System. On line at: www.federalreserve.gov /newsevents/ press/bcreg/ bcreg20090424a1.pdf.   23 
framework of the newly created Council of Financial Stability (September 2009). The G20 gathers 
twenty developed and big developing countries, which share the idea according to which measures 
for increasing financial stability should be implemented at a global level. After a first meeting in 
London in April 2009, leaders of the G20 countries met again in September 2009 in Pittsburgh, at a 
time where tensions in the financial markets faded away. The agreed rules were minimalist. Many 
governments agree on that the central banks’ financial oversight attributions should be reinforced. 
Most important, banks will be required to build larger capital reserves, and a leverage ratio will be 
implemented before 2012. Top officials in France and Germany argued in favour of capping traders’ 
bonuses. The G20 could not reach any international agreement on that proposal, which was left to 
the discretion of national authorities. Several countries (US, UK, France) have since imposed some 
taxes on the traders’ 2009 bonus; in June 2010 the US Administration urged financial institutions to 
take more aggressive steps to make sure that pay packages are “consistent with the soundness of the 
organization”, but did not impose any further limits. 
 
In the years before the crisis, many large banks, both in the US and Europe, set up large proprietary 
trading desks, actually mimicking the activity of hedge funds. In January 2010, a US Committee run by 
the former Fed chairman Paul Volcker, recommended that banks should be forbidden to carry out 
such kind of proprietary trading. This would also limit the amount of risk that banks can take on their 
balance sheets. 
 
Finally, noteworthy positive action for standardisation of derivatives has also been taken by the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association. To limit the risks related to the CDS market, the US 
Administration and European Commission decided to support creation of private clearing houses to 
centralise the two-way trading involved in CDSs. 
 
On the other hand, governments have been surprisingly silent on the need to enforce competition in 
the  banking  and  financial  sector.  During  this  crisis,  many  difficulties  concerned  establishments 
previously considered "too big to fail": financial giants that were often badly managed but would 
have caused major disruption if they had gone bankrupt. So far, the only proposal directly aiming to 
improve  the  governance  of  the  large  firms  is  to  create  a  fast-track  procedure  through  which 
governments can liquidate in a neat way too-big-to fail firms should they become insolvent. Yet there 
are little discussions of how to foster competition within the banking sector. The banking sector in 
many  countries  has  all  the  characteristics  of  an  oligopoly.  Limiting  banks  size,  tightening  the 
competition  authorities’  supervision  and  opening  the  borders  to  true  competition  from  abroad 
would  help  dismantling  it,  to  the  benefit  of  the  consumers.
25  Stiglitz (2010) identifies a more  
powerful competition between financial institutions of a smaller size as one important way to 




As in resolution of past crises, during the 2007-2009 period the most powerful anti-crisis weapon 
took the form of adjustments implemented by the private players themselves under the impact of 
market forces. We have already witnessed the disappearance of investment banks as such; the large 
diversified banks are redesigning their strategy in order to focus on safer activities.
26 Banks are also 
strengthening their proprietary risk management systems. 
                                                           
25 Actually, during this crisis, the European governments have looked favourably on internal mergers. In Britain, 
the number one mortgage lender HBOS was taken over by Lloyds TSB, the country’s fifth-largest bank, and still 
benefited from the government’s recapitalisation plan. 
26  As a consequence, many top traders involved in high risk trades preferred to leave their investment 
departments and joined hedge funds.   24 
 
On the other hand, a move towards concentration in the banking sector can now be observed, 
essentially inside national frontiers. Little progress is made toward increasing competition in the 
banking sector, as if in these difficult times for the financial profession, national policymakers were 
more concerned about banks’ earnings and banks’ survival than consumers’ welfare. 
 
While it is too soon to venture a precise tendency for the future organization of the financial system, 
this crisis taught us some hard lessons that will guide the restructuring process: 
  It showed that developed countries are not insulated from the curse of multiple equilibria, 
and that a sharp reversal in individuals’ expectations can bring about major disruption of 
financial markets. 
  Far from diluting risk, the new financial instruments were at the origin of new form of risks, 
unsuspected before, such as the risk of bankruptcy of protection sellers in CDS contracts, or 
the worthless CDOs when the value of the underling asset collapses; 
  Shocks originated in financial markets do propagate to the real sector and thus entail large 
social losses; 
  The public administration (government and central bank) can help overcoming such crisis of 
trust by rapid, coordinated, comprehensive and limited in time interventions. In the longer 
run, the main challenge for policymakers is to maintain competition alive in the financial 
sector. 
 
The fifteen years leading up to the crisis were years of great prosperity: output and labor productivity 
rose constantly, and the performance of the labour markets improved all over the world, one effect 
being a sharp decline in unemployment. As these achievements took place in a period of significant 
market deregulation, the public authorities appeared to be destined for gradual withdrawal from the 
economic sphere, whatever the extent of this withdrawal. But in the critical phases of this crisis, it 
has  been  obvious  that  the  public  authorities  –  governments  and  central  banks  –  were  the  last 
stronghold of stability. Events have shown that the authorities should maintain and reinforce their 
capacity for action in a time of crisis – for sure, the aim is not to expand the public sector, but to 
equip policymakers with tools for rapid intervention in case of economic troubles. Such tools range 
from standardization, committed expenses and guaranties, to enhancing transparency by shedding 
light on normally hidden activities within banks. 
 
Before this crisis, public authorities and private players had delegated risk assessment to the three 
major ratings agencies. These agencies appear to have failed once again in assessing the risk on 
structured products, just as they failed in 2000-2001 to report a correct assessment of the risk 
associated with shares in companies such as Enron, Qwest and WorldCom (Vranceanu, 2005). Two 
outrageous errors in ten years is too much for players occupying a pivotal role in the worldwide 
financial system. An in-depth reform of the risk assessment system is thus more than necessary, and 
reflection on the matter is only just beginning. Many solutions can be considered, from creation of 
new agencies to foster genuine competition, or total abandonment of this type of credit risk rating to 
the benefit of producing in-house, decentralised information. As an example of private production of 
information, some banks have issued unrated CDOs, and fully disclosed the elements needed by 
potential buyers to assess the risk of the portfolio without having to rely on a rating agency. 
 
Whenever  a  market  overheats,  certain  individuals  are  more  tempted  to  abuse  the  system  and 
commit acts both immoral and illegal. In the US, Bernard Madoff, an established fund manager, had 
in fact introduced an illegal pyramid scheme that resulted in net losses of USD 13 billion for investors. 
The Texan financier Allan Stanford is accused of a similar type of fraud, in which investors lost a total 
of approximately USD 8 billion. In France, Jerôme Kerviel, a trader with the Société Générale, took 
unauthorized bets that ultimately led to a loss of 4.9 billion euros for the bank. Nonetheless, these   25 
are exceptions and seem to be epiphenomena. Fraud and swindling are not the distinctive mark of 
this crisis - in fact, a much higher number of cases of fraud (earnings manipulation) were registered 
during the 2000-2001 dotcom crisis than this time. 
 
While broadly speaking the law has been respected, the state of mind of the financial sector as a 
whole is a problem. What justification can there be for the “casino” attitude that appears to be the 
watchword in many banks, which strictly speaking are supposed to manage their clients’ deposits 
and shareholders’ interests prudently and within a long-run perspective? What explanation can there 
be for the European banks' rush on US-produced CDOs? Supposing that returns are visible but the 
risk is not, maybe the fragile banks sought to offer the same returns as the sounder banks, taking 
more risks simply to attract investors. But microeconomic explanations might not provide the answer 
to the underlying question of why, in the world of finance, players sometimes manage to become 
disconnected from the world they live in, caring only for abstract money performance which has 
nothing to do with the constructive search for profit going on everywhere else in the economy 
(Solomon, 1992). 
 
After this crisis, which could have turned into a much more dramatic systemic meltdown, the whole 
world is in the position of a driver who has narrowly avoided a serious road accident thanks to an 
almost  animal  instinct  for  survival.  Like  the  driver  who  has  escaped  a  tragic  fate,  we  are  left 
wondering what we should do to ensure we never find ourselves in the same position. Change 
things:  yes,  but  how?  The  solutions  of  restrictive  regulations,  or  even  central  planning,  are  not 
compatible  with  sustainable  growth.  Furthermore,  some  regulations  themselves  can  explain  the 
additional  volatility.  Nor  is  extreme  deregulation:  in  the  universe  of  finance,  it  leads  to  the 
emergence of giant institutions, sometimes fragile because badly-managed. Frustrating though it 
might be, no-one currently has a satisfactory answer. After the Great Crisis, three years passed 
before Keynes published his General Theory, and another ten years before it became a benchmark 
work. This record is unlikely to be beaten. To end on an optimistic note, what should be remembered 
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